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abstract:  This paper addresses a neglected area in studies of migrant labor in the Gulf States showing 
that exploitation of migrant workers occurs before deployment. Evidence from interviews conducted in 
the five major labour sending countries to Qatar (Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India) 
suggests that the recruitment procedures and corrupt practices by recruitment agencies and employing 
company personnel in the receiving country place unskilled workers in a highly vulnerable position prior 
to departure from their home countries. As a consequence of practices such as deception, false promises, 
substitute contracts, bribery, and extortion, there is evidence of debt bondage, forced labor, and traffick-
ing within the normative framework of labor migration. Reform measures that are currently underway 
in Qatar include the banning of workers paying recruitment fees and charges to agents.
Keywords: Laws and regulations, Human rights, Labor rights, Recruitment, Trafficking,  
Labour market, Foreign labour, Unskilled labour, Low-skilled labour, Visa and fees, Qatar
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Introduction 
S ince the 1980s, the Gulf region has been one of the largest recipients in the world of labour mi-gration flows. Using the available data for 2010 and 2013, the GLMM database estimates some 23 million non-nationals (48.1 per cent) in the six countries.1 Of the GCC states, and indeed the 
world, Qatar has the largest proportion of foreigners in its population with nationals representing no 
more than 12 per cent and even less (6.2 per cent in 2012) of its workforce of approximately 1.34 mil-
lion;2 Qatari males constitute only 4.7 per cent of the total male workforce and 1 per cent of the private 
sector workforce.3  
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Few analysts have addressed the procedures and problems in the recruitment of low-skilled (male) 
migrant workers for the construction industries of the Gulf States. Most observers and human rights 
critics target the governments of the migrant receiving countries, pressing for legislative reform and im-
plementation of international labour standards. Recent critical reports on the state of migrant workers in 
Qatar by international organisations4 have largely neglected any detailed analysis of the rights violations 
and corruption that occurs prior to migrant workers’ departure and on immediate arrival. 
This paper is based on a qualitative study commissioned by the Qatar Foundation to look into the 
recruitment processes that lead to debt bondage, forced labour, and human trafficking.5 In addition to 
Qatar, the five main labour-sending countries were visited – Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
and India. A total of 148 interviews were conducted with migrant workers, government representatives, 
recruitment agencies, academics, NGOs and international organizations involved with migrant rights. 
The recruitment practices that lead to the violations addressed were largely the same for all five countries.
In Qatar, as elsewhere in the Gulf States, large construction and services projects are tendered out 
by the state, or “clients” of the state that include organisations such as the Qatar Foundation, Q-Rail, 
Ashgal (the Public Works Authority) or Q22 (the Supreme Committee for the 2022 soccer World 
Cup). Companies and corporations who are contracted to carry out these projects may be local, foreign 
or internationally based, but the establishment of a company in Qatar usually requires that majority 
ownership (51 per cent) should be held by a Qatari national partner (whether individual or corporate). 
The vast majority of employees recruited by these contractors (and their sub-contractors) are for-
eign, primarily from other Arab states and South Asia. The so-called low-skilled and semi-skilled work-
ers for the construction industry, the main focus of this paper, come from the five South Asian countries 
studied. While there are no official statistics showing the nationality or ethnicity of the population or 
workforce in Qatar, a study by Gardner et al. (2013) with a random sample of 1,000 male, low-income 
migrant workers,6 found the main countries of origin were from Nepal (38.5 per cent), India (28.5 per 
cent), Bangladesh (11 per cent), Sri Lanka (8.5 per cent) Philippines (5.3 per cent), Pakistan (3.3 per 
cent) and Egypt (3 per cent). The study also showed that 71.9 per cent of the workers were married, and 
88.1 per cent of them had children.7 Despite their marital status, none of these workers are allowed to 
have family members accompany them because their income is below QR 10,000 ($2,700) per month.8 
It has been estimated that as of 2011, around 450,000 blue-collar workers were employed in the con-
struction industry in Qatar, with around 64,000 employed in the Qatar Foundation’s various capital pro-
jects that it tenders out to private sector contractors.9 These figures have most likely increased since 2011 
and may be doubled over the next few years as the construction projects for the World Cup are launched.
recruitment process
Contractors, their subcontractors, as well as labour supply companies10 and placement agencies in Qatar 
are largely responsible for the recruitment of migrant workers within the guidelines of visa regulations, 
labour law, and sponsorship law.11 They mainly use private recruitment agencies in the countries of 
origin, but also individual migrant networks, often through their own employees who act as individual 
brokers. Sometimes government-to-government labour supply agreements are made between Qatar and 
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the sending countries, particularly where there are government recruitment agencies such as the Bang-
ladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited (BOESL) and the Sri Lanka Foreign Employment 
Agency (SLFEA).
The most formal corporate procedure is to produce a labour “demand letter” that details the posi-
tions available to be filled and specifying the preferred country of recruitment. The demand letter is sent 
to the Ministry of Labour to obtain visa approval for the positions. In Qatar, however, there is a national-
ity quota system whereby the ministry may deny a position applied for and reject a particular nationality 
(quota details are not made public). For example, in 2012-13, contractors in Qatar complained that they 
were unable to get visas for Indian workers who are the most numerous in the country. This often results 
in visas being granted for positions and nationalities that are counter to a contractor’s requirements. 
Thus, if there are not enough visas for masons available, a contractor will use an available scaffolder visa 
and have the worker doing masonry, a situation that places workers in a vulnerable position of having 
occupations other than those listed in their visa and residence permit. 
Governments of all five labour sending countries visited have legislated a fee structure that workers 
pay local recruitment agents. The Philippines, Nepal, and Sri Lanka stipulate a one-month salary, Bang-
ladesh three months’ salary and India, one and a half months (45 working days) salary.12 These charges, 
however, are only for the agent’s commission, and other charges (largely unmonitored by the authori-
ties) are foisted upon workers that may include the visa fee, local transport and accommodation, airfare, 
medical examination, advertising, pre-departure seminar, and various government taxes. Interviews with 
recruitment agencies in these countries showed a range of charges, from $600-1,500. However, inter-
views with workers in Qatar and returnees in their home countries showed many paying more, from 
$600-3,000 and up to $5,000. These are very large amounts for the poor low-skilled workers who most 
often sell family assets and take out loans at usurious interest rates – from 30-60 per cent.13
Contracts and Deception
Most migrant workers do not understand the provisions set out in their contracts, other than the amount 
of wages they will receive. Most do not sign a contract before their departure. Some are provided with 
a “job offer” in the form of a letter, but this is not a contract and is not signed by the worker. Most con-
tracts that are given prior to departure are often signed under duress – at the airport, for example, when 
the impetus to leave has already been established, or on immediate arrival in the country of destination. 
Contracts are rarely written in the native language of the migrant worker and employing companies rely 
upon recruitment agents to convey the contractual arrangements, but there is rarely any proof that this is 
carried out adequately or honestly. It is also common for companies to ignore these contracts and issue a 
substitute contract with wages and conditions that are less than originally promised. Workers are either 
not given a copy of their original contract or told to destroy it when they arrive to eradicate evidence of 
contract substitution.
In the case of Filipina migrant domestic workers, substitute contracts have become standard prac-
tice since 2006, when the Philippines government legislated their minimum monthly salary to $400. 
As few employers in receiving countries are willing to pay this amount, recruitment agencies routinely 
have them sign two contracts, one at the $400 rate (to leave the country legitimately) and another with 
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whatever the employer is willing to pay, such as $250-300, or less. Workers are never given a copy of 
the substitute contract as prevention against possible legal action against the agency.14 The Philippines 
minimum wage requirement for domestic workers thus became a moral hazard.15 
Costs of recruitment
Those workers who take out loans to pay for recruitment charges (46 per cent of those in the Gardner 
et. al. study) are vulnerable to debt bondage, forced labour, and trafficking. For example, many construc-
tion workers interviewed did not get the salary and/or food allowances they were promised prior to their 
departure. When they complained to the company after their arrival, they were told that if they did not 
accept the situation, they could return to their home country, at their own expense. The companies are 
well aware that the worker may be in debt, having paid for the recruitment costs, and that he will not 
have enough money to pay for the return airfare and will be reluctant to shamefully return home without 
providing the financial support for his family.16 Thus, the worker must accept what is offered and that it 
will take him longer to repay the loan (normally between 4-6 months, but up to one year). Under these 
circumstances, the worker is caught in debt bondage, even though the debt is not directly owed to the 
employer. They are also forced to work for a salary, or possibly in a job, that they are unhappy with.17 The 
company is exploiting the situation of such workers and profiting from it. Thus, the company is complicit 
in debt bondage, forced labour, and a case of trafficking that includes the three elements of: 1) transpor-
tation by 2) means of deception for 3) economic exploitation or forced labour.18
There are a number of different arrangements that are negotiated between companies recruiting 
workers, placement agencies or individual brokers, and recruitment agencies in the origin countries. 
First, the employer may pay all the fees and charges to bring workers into the country. Second, the fees 
and charges may be shared between the employer and employee. In this arrangement, the employer usu-
ally pays for the cost of the interview, visa, work permit and the airfare. The employee pays for all other 
costs, including the agency’s commission. In the third type of arrangement, the worker pays for all costs 
and charges, except for the visa and work permit. Qatari law, for example, requires employers to pay for 
visa charges and also forbids employers or placement agencies in Qatar to deduct any wages for recruit-
ment or placement fees.19 It is well known, however, that recruitment agencies in the origin countries do 
charge workers for visas and work permits as well as the fees for placement agencies in Qatar prior to de-
parture and remit money to placement agencies in Qatar using the informal hawala system of monetary 
exchange to circumvent the law.20 Having workers pay for the recruitment costs and charges reduces the 
overheads for the employing company making them more competitive in tendering for construction or 
services projects. 
It is widely accepted that workers pay for recruitment fees and charges. Indeed, where employers 
pay the recruitment costs and fees, many agencies also charge workers, receiving payment from both. 
Neither employers nor employees ask one another if they have paid the agency or how much; nor do 
regulatory bodies in the origin or destination countries question migrant workers about how much they 
have paid. Recruitment agencies merely state the regulatory requirements in their documentation. 
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Critical analyses by organisations such as Human Rights Watch21 and Amnesty International22 
have pointed to “excessive” or “illegal” charges (that is, above the maximum allowable by sending country 
governments) rather than questioning whether they should pay anything at all. Accepting that migrant 
workers must pay more than they can afford, in Nepal and Bangladesh, the Probashi Kallyan Bank pro-
vides non-collateral loans for recruitment fees, receiving wages directly (an important means to record 
delayed or non-payment of wages) and facilitating remittances. Even the World Bank report on financial 
flows between Nepal and Qatar recommended that workers pay these loans from their wages through 
monthly deductions by their employers and remitted to the manpower agencies in Nepal, a practice that 
would presumably contravene current Qatari labour law.23 
Competition and Corruption
It is not clear when it began, but according to interviews with ministries and recruitment agencies, the 
period of the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and the consequent slowdown of construction projects in the 
Gulf States created a fierce competition between recruitment agencies in the labour sending countries. 
They began with offers to contractors to supply workers at lower wage rates. Offering to supply workers 
free of charge followed this. That is, the agencies would charge workers all the costs and commissions, 
rather than the employing company. While Manolo Abella has argued that “what the recruiter gets is not 
a fee for the recruiter’s service but a ‘bribe’” to procure the job,24 these “bribes” are solicited or extorted 
by recruitment agencies and individual brokers and backed by government regulations in the sending 
countries that allow recruitment agents to charge workers for their fees. Yet most skilled and professional 
employees do not pay recruitment costs, charges or fees. It is largely the poorest, low-skilled migrant 
workers, the vast majority of migrant labour in the Gulf States, who are paying and going into debt, due 
to their desperation to secure work. 
Charges to workers are not the only form of bribery and corruption that exists in the labour re-
cruitment industry. It is also common that personnel of the employing company, such as human resource 
managers and engineers, travel to the sending countries to conduct trade or skills testing and selection of 
prospective workers. Many recruitment agencies interviewed complained that they were obliged to pay 
for their hotel bills, food, “entertainment” in casinos and brothels, and sometimes airfares. Sometimes, 
the receipts from the hotels and restaurants are taken back for company reimbursement, even though the 
agents have paid for them.
In addition, recruitment agents regularly offer (or are required to offer) “kickback” bribes to the em-
ploying company personnel making the recruitment decisions, such as choosing the agent and providing 
the labour supply contract. The amounts paid vary between $300-600 per worker and sometimes go up 
to $1,000 per worker. In other words, a labour supply contract for 100 workers at $600 per head will yield 
$60,000 as a cash gratuity “with no paperwork.” The source for these and the other payments made by re-
cruitment agents is the unwitting migrant workers who are unaware of what their “recruitment fees” are 
for and how they are being dispersed. Receipts are almost never given to workers for the amounts they 
pay the agents, and certainly no detailed breakdown of the costs is provided. It is not clear to what extent 
the senior executives of these companies are aware of these transactions. However, one recruitment agent 
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revealed that he paid these funds directly into a company’s account, for his own records. Presumably, this 
company treated the payment as legitimate income.
reform Measures
These findings and recommendations, revealed in the early stages of the study, have resulted in reform 
measures on recruitment in the Qatar Foundation’s Mandatory Standards for Migrant Worker Welfare 
for Contractors and Subcontractors (QF Mandatory Standards), published in April 2013.25 The docu-
ment covers the whole migration cycle, from recruitment, deployment, living and working conditions, 
and repatriation home and includes standards for recruitment, contracts, termination provisions,26 sup-
ply of food, accommodation, health and safety, and transportation. These new standards have high-level 
support from the Qatari state authorities. 
As a commercial requirement, rather than legislation, the new standards will apply to all future 
contract tenders from the pre-qualification stage, requiring potential contractors to agree with them and 
demonstrate willingness to comply. The QF Standards have been adopted by Q-Rail and others, includ-
ing the Supreme Committee for the FIFA World Cup in 2022 (Q22) and have been acknowledged as 
path breaking and “inspiring” by international organisations like the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
for Migrant Rights, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. Teams of welfare officers have 
been established to monitor and audit the implementation of the standards, with commercial penalties 
for non-compliance. The details of penalties have not yet been made public but can include disqualifica-
tion for future contracts and financial penalties.27 At the time of writing, discussions are being conducted 
for a set of national standards for migrant worker welfare that will be based upon, but supersede, the QF 
and Q22 standards. It is hoped that in time, other countries of the Gulf will follow suit.
In brief, the migrant worker welfare standards in Qatar will require all future contractors to pay for 
the recruitment charges and fees, mandating that workers are not to pay anything, other than perhaps 
the cost of their passports, birth and education certificates, and possibly insurance policies mandated 
by their governments. They should arrive in the country debt-free. Statements to this effect are to be 
made explicit in the advertisements for jobs in the origin countries, and in pre-departure orientation 
seminars.28 Where workers can be proven to have paid recruitment fees, the employer will be obliged to 
reimburse them and place a ban on further business with the recruitment agent.
The implementation of these new arrangements will require the use of accredited “ethical recruit-
ment agencies.” Among other characteristics, these are agencies who will not take money from prospec-
tive workers and who will circumvent the use of independent sub-agents in the origin countries. Sub-
agents are relied upon to recruit from outlying regional areas away from the predominantly urban-based 
agency offices. Although they are often known, trusted and prominent people at the local level, they are 
also the source of misinformation, deception, and further bribery costs.29
The principle underlying the reform is that state authorities, along with their contractors and sub-
contractors, have a responsibility to actively intervene in the recruitment process in the sending countries 
in order to prevent the corruption and exploitative conditions by prohibiting migrant workers from 
paying fees in the origin countries. The new standards in relation to recruitment were not designed to 
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change the law, or establish new legislation, but as an ethical-contractual agreement in the course of 
commercial business practice. It is an intervention to change the recruitment practices of the interna-
tional labour market.
The implementation of the new recruitment standards will also require government-to-govern-
ment agreements to change the existing regulations in the sending countries that allow recruitment 
charges to be paid for by workers. The Qatar government has signed labour agreements with many 
countries since the 1980s, but more recently with Nepal, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka as well 
as Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritius, Yemen and, possibly, Tunisia. These may be seen more as memoranda 
of understanding rather than bilateral agreements that have monitoring mechanisms and responsibili-
ties specified. The principles of ethical recruitment, however, must be standardised through bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements such as the Colombo Process that has made several overtures towards ethical 
recruitment, but has not committed to any details, particularly along the lines that have now been estab-
lished in Qatar.30 Indeed, it is possible that apart from private ethical recruitment agencies, government 
recruitment agencies can be utilized, such as the Bangladesh Overseas Employment Services Limited 
(BOESL) and the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), which are now increasing 
their operations and may be more conducive to ethical recruitment because of direct government control 
and an interest in the welfare of their nationals. In India, each state has its own government recruitment 
agency. The Gulf governments or their clients could also establish their own ethical recruitment agencies 
in the sending countries, in collaboration with their embassies. 
Using Internet data exchange of worker profiles and visa permits, inter-governmental labour re-
cruitment and placement agreements are increasing and bypassing private recruitment agencies, but al-
though figures are unavailable, it is likely they are not significant at the present time. The Qatar Ministry 
of Labour recently announced a programme for an electronic information base for job applicants, from 
which employers in Qatar can select candidates and provide a more transparent regulatory system.31 
Similarly, India’s Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs has established an “e-Governance” or “e-Migrate” 
program for, greater levels of efficiency, transparency and accountability in the emigration system. … 
[automating] emigration clearance, registration and employers’ permits, dispense with discretion, miti-
gate harassment of emigrants and remove corruption. … interlinking with recruiting agents, employers, 
immigration counters, Indian Missions abroad, insurance companies and state governments, etc.32 
Conclusion
The banning of recruitment fees and other charges to workers is one of the most important reforms re-
quired in the labour markets from South Asia to the Gulf States. In principle, it should eliminate most 
of the corrupt practices between recruitment agents in the sending countries to agents and employing 
companies in receiving countries; and with government vigilance it should also dry up the market for 
visa trading, the costs of which are usually born by migrant workers. The money that workers pay is at 
the heart of the unjust practices and conditions that make them vulnerable to debt bondage, forced 
labour, and trafficking. To bring about this reform, solutions are required to establish cross-national ju-
risdictions between origin and destination countries. This will include discussions and agreements over 
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joint liability33 and how blame can be apportioned when things go wrong between recruitment agencies, 
employees, employers, and governments.
A serious and systematic campaign needs to make clear to all labour sending countries (prospective 
migrant workers, governments, recruitment agencies, brokers and their associations) and receiving coun-
tries in the Gulf (authorities, employing companies and organisations, labour suppliers, placement agen-
cies and embassies) that migrant labour must arrive debt free and without having paid recruitment fees, 
costs, and charges before departure, or after arrival from their salaries. The campaign also requires the 
infrastructural facilities for the sustainable implementation, monitoring, and policing of the new ethical 
standards for migrant worker welfare as has been developed in Qatar – countrywide and internationally. 
Perhaps the most urgent requirement is the establishment of an accreditation and training system for 
private and public ethical recruitment agencies. 
There is a great deal of cynicism among international agencies regarding Qatar’s willingness and 
ability to implement serious reforms for migrant worker welfare. The new standards offer a promising 
strategy to restructure and re-orient recruitment practices to eliminate the human and labour rights vio-
lations and corruption detailed earlier. These standards, when adopted at the national level, should oblige 
the Qatar government to implement them as a matter of policy, along with the other provisions regard-
ing working and living conditions of migrant workers. The reform process has begun, but it remains to 
be seen how long it will take and how well it will be implemented, monitored, policed, and sustained. 
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